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Wei Zhang’s Heidegger, Rorty, and the Eastern Thinkers: A Hermeneutic of 
Crosscultural Encounter adds to a relatively small but significant and hopefully growing 
list of titles dedicated to exploring the problematic encounter between Western and 
Eastern philosophical traditions. Zhang’s efforts are to be commended as she tackles 
difficult and often impenetrable topics, especially those topics pertaining to 
Heideggerian philosophy. Despite the occasional, insightful comment, I was a bit 
disappointed with the work as a whole. The four sections — (1) The Recurring East- 
West Hermeneutic Riddle, (2) Richard Rorty’s Correspondence with a Comparative 
Philosopher, (3) Martin Heidegger’s Dialogue with a Japanese Visitor, and (4) A 
Conceptual Dialogue with Heidegger’s Text on Hermeneutics — do not hang 
together very well. The rather cursory, introductory first section aside, the remaining 
three sections appear to be separate, disconnected essays. In the absence of a 
satisfying conclusion tying the three discussions together, the reader does not get the 
sense that he or she has been introduced to or persuaded of ‘a hermeneutic of 
crosscultural encounter.’ All the same, the attentive reader may in fact discern that 
Zhang endorses the notion that cross-cultural encounter is undertaken in the name of 
edification and eventual reduction of alterity: ‘trying to proceed with caution from 
topics and issues that they are not familiar with... encouraging one to retrieve what 
would otherwise be overlooked or forgotten in one’s own tradition only to discover 
what appeared to be foreign is actually already embedded as familiar in one’s own 
tradition’ (57). Such a suspiciously conservative hermeneutic has been rightly 
contested by such thinkers as Jarava Lal Mehta, Mark C. Taylor, and Jacque Derrida. 
Unfortunately, Zhang does not address this issue. For those familiar with the 
problems attending comparative philosophy, there is nothing truly new here; for 
those unfamiliar with such problems, I am afraid this book does not serve as an 
adequate introductory text. What’s more, for those uninitiated in the notoriously 
abstruse ‘Heideggerian speak,’ Zhang fails to ‘translate’ the central philosophical 
issues into accessible language. 
Perhaps reflective of the edification at the heart of Zhang’s hermeneutic, a subtle— 
though most certainly unintended — Orientalism informs the text. Throughout 
Orientalist literature and strategy, one often finds the assignation of agency to the 
Western individual and the consequent relegation of the ‘Eastern individual’ to a 
group-determined response. Western individuals initiate; Eastern individuals 
represent. Especially in comparative philosophical discussions, we often find an 
individual Western philosopher compared to an ‘Eastern school,’ for example, 
‘Heidegger and Zen.’ While Heidegger agentially determines his position, the Zen 
tradition putatively determines the position of the ‘Eastern representative.’ In 
classical Orientalist fashion, the assigned anonymity of ‘Eastern thinkers’ suggests 
the occlusion of their agency: the ‘Eastern thinkers,’ that is, the ‘Comparative 
Philosopher’ and the ‘Japanese Visitor’ ultimately react to Rortian and Heideggerian 
positions. 
Rorty argues that ‘philosophy,’ that is, the search for essences is irreducibly 
Western, and as such, comparative philosophy is not a viable program. Balslev — 
with whom Zhang is apparently most sympathetic — notes that Rorty is ethnocentric 
on this score. Balslev claims that Rorty’s essentializing definition of philosophy as 
Western precludes the possibility that other cultures have philosophy. While Rorty 
may be rightly castigated for a certain ethnocentrism, he need not be reprimanded for 
his definitions as such. If ‘philosophy’ is to mean anything at all it must be defined, 
and definitions entail exclusions. If Balslev and Zhang dislike Rorty’s definition, so 
be it. They ought to offer up some alternative. This we do not get here. The 
interesting point, however — and one apparently underappreciated by Balslev and 
Zhang — is that Rorty is not triumphalistic in his relegation of philosophy to the 
West. Indeed, having negotiated the post-metaphysical turn, Rorty is uninterested in 
any philosophical systems, West or East. As such, comparative philosophy — like 
philosophy in general — is a dead subject matter for this neo-pragmatist. To be fair 
to Rorty, we can easily imagine his endorsement of a comparative literature project 
in which the authors considered are Orwell, Nabokov, and Rushdie. Rorty is not 
anti-Other. He is anti-philosophy. 
On precisely this issue of the other, I sense confusion in Zhang’s presentation of 
Balslev. Balslev argues that Rorty dismisses the Other. Hardly. Rorty recognizes a 
difference between the philosophical Other and the anthropological other. As one 
uninterested in philosophy, Rorty may be equally uninterested in the philosophical 
discussions of alterity. Of course, and on one significant register, these discussions 
have nothing to do with anthropological alterity. Thanks to Derrida, we know that 
the philosophical Other is every other: the cross-cultural other and the intra-cultural 
other are equally other. That being said, it is clear that Rorty is concerned with the 
anthropological other as he openly petitions for social and economic justice across 
all cultures. Philosophically speaking, the distinction between philosophical alterity 
and anthropological alterity is worth preserving, a preservation found wanting in 
Zhang’s presentation of Balslev. 
 
Zhang’s third section appears to be a recapitulation of the exchange between 
Heidegger and the ‘Japanese visitor’ found in Heidegger’s On the Way to Language. 
I did not find anything particularly new in this discussion. What is perhaps 
significant, however, is Zhang’s recognition that this exchange is much more 
amicable than the one between Rorty and Balslev. Zhang does not comment on the 
potential reasons for the disparity. Perhaps we should. Heidegger and Tezuka find 
that they can come to a mutual understanding that language opens up a primordial 
realm of Being. Zhang notes, ‘if there were a common language origin in both 
German and Japanese traditions, there might be an existing “shared” language world, 
regardless of the differences in actual speech of them, respectively... it would allow 
the speakers to bring themselves ever closer to the earthly nature and onto-cosmic 
origin of their existence’(64–65). Aside from the difficulties of discerning what 
precisely ‘onto-cosmic origin’ means, we must pause when an earthly, primordial 
Being trumps ‘differences in actual speech.’ As the American philosopher John D. 
Caputo rightly notes, Heideggerian discussions concerning primordial Being invoke 
a ‘Nazi myth.’ While Rorty and Balslev inherit a cultural history marked by 
antagonistic, colonial interests and contests, Heidegger and Tezuka share cultural 
histories marked by fascism. The German-Japanese philosophical amity presented 
here raises some interesting — though unaddressed — ethical concerns. 
The final section introduces the reader to an early Heideggerian text—Ontology — 
The Hermeneutics of Facticity. This section includes one of the more lucid 
expositions of the Heideggerian position, but the eventual comparison between 
Heidegger’s ‘family table’ and the Chinese Buddhist Fa-tsang’s discussion of two 
golden lions leaves much to be desired. Zhang does not in any way elucidate how 
Fatsang’s ‘gold’ is empty (shunyata) nor does she clearly demonstrate the relevance of 
the two lions to Heidegger’s hermeneutics. Lastly, Zhang makes a quick mention of 
the (dubious) relevance of Fritjof Capra’s work to Eastern mysticism. In general, this 
final discussion seems thrown together and ultimately without connection to the two 
preceding discussions. 
 
Rorty’s position notwithstanding, I believe comparative philosophy is an 
interesting and potentially fruitful endeavor. I appreciate Zhang’s interests in 
documenting the complex and difficult exchanges between Rorty and Balslev and 
Heidegger and Tezuka. All the same, and precisely because of the difficulties 
attending such comparative tasks, authors need to be precise and consistent about the 
terms they are using and the agenda they are pursuing. I am unconvinced that Zhang 
succeeds on this score. I also believe that it is time we adjust the comparative 
program. Instead of assuming the Western position and then turning to potential 
resonances in Eastern traditions, perhaps we should begin with the East and search 
for both resonances and differences in the West. In other words, it is time we pursue 
such comparisons by commencing with an ‘Eastern thinker’ rather than the 
‘Western thinkers.’ 
 
